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accounted for just 11 percent of GNP, with over 45 percent of output 
concentrated in the primary sector. The next chapters examine Korea’s 
transformation into a rapidly growing economic miracle. 
3 An Overview of Korea’s 
External Debt 
In 1962 Korea’s external debt stood at $58 million, only 2.5 percent of GNP. 
By 1982 Korea had accumulated over $37 billion in external debt, or 52.7 
percent of GNP, ranking it fourth in the list of debtor countries. After an 
impressive turnaround, Korea began to reduce its external debt in 1986. This 
chapter presents and discusses a number of debt statistics. The objective is to 
identify the key trends to be examined in detail in subsequent chapters. In 
addition to the tables in the text, we refer extensively to debt tables from the 
Data Appendix. 
3.1 Korea’s External Debt 
Table 3.1 traces the accumulation of Korean debt from 1961 to 1986. As 
shown, the debt stock rose steadily until 1985, with an average annual 
increase of $2 billion. Over 75 percent of the increase between 1962 and 
1982 occurred during three periods of rapid debt accumulation. From 1966 
to 1969 the debt rose from $0.35 to $1.8 billion, or from 9.6 percent to 27.2 
percent of GNP. A second jump followed the 1973 increase in oil prices. The 
debt stock increased by $4.2 billion from 1973 to 1975, pushing the 
debt/GNP ratio to 40.6 percent. As debt accumulation slowed during the 
recovery period from 1975 to 1978, the debt/GNP ratio fell back to 28.6 
percent. The third period of rapid accumulation began in 1979. Over the next 
three years, the debt stock rose from $14.9 to $37.3 billion, while the 
debt/GNP ratio jumped to 52.7 percent. During the subsequent recovery 
(1982-83, the debtXNP ratio averaged 53.8 percent before falling below 
47 percent in 1986. The three periods of accumulation will be examined in 
chapters 4 and 5. We return to the recent debt decumulation in chapter 13. 
Table A2.1 in the Data Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of 
external debt by maturity and borrower. It identifies two other aspects of 
Korea’s external debt history. It shows that there have been considerable 
shifts in the term structure of the debt. There have also been shifts in the 
composition of the debt between the public sector and the bank and nonbank 
private sector. 
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Table 3.1 Korea's External Debt, 1961-86 (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Debt 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Total foreign debt 83 89 157 177 206 392 645 1,199 1.800 
Foreign direct 
investment - 1 3 6 16 21 34 49 56 
ForeigndebUGNP 3.9 3.8 5.8 6.2 6.9 10.7 15.1 22.9 21.2 
Foreign debt plus 
direct 
investmenUGNP 3.9 3.9 5.9 6.4 7.4 11.3 15.9 23.9 28.0 
Debt service ratio' 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.6 5.0 3.2 5.4 5.4 8.6 
Debt 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 I978 
Total foreign debt 2,245 2,922 3,589 4,257 5.933 8,443 10,520 12,649 14,823 
Foreign direct 
investment 81 117 175 329 486 549 650 741 830 
Foreign debVGNP 28.7 31.2 34.0 31.5 32.0 40.5 36.7 33.8 28.5 
Foreign debt plus 
direct 
investmenUGNP 29.7 32.4 35.6 34.0 34.6 43.1 38.9 35.8 30.1 
Debt service ratio' 18.5 21.0 18.7 14.8 14.4 14.4 12.1 11.1 13.9 
Debt 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total foreign debt 20,287 27,170 32.433 37,083 40,378 43,053 46,762 44,510 
Foreign direct 
investment 866 873 975 1,044 1,112 1,222 1.456 1,891 
Foreign debUGNP 32.5 45.0 49.0 53.5 53.1 52.3 56.3 46.8 
Foreign debt plus 
direct 
investmenUGNP 33.9 46.5 50.4 55.0 54.6 53.7 58.0 48.8 
Debt service ratio' 16.3 18.5 20.1 20.6 18.8 20.4 21.7 22.7 
'Includes interest on short-term debt. 
In the table, debt is divided into three maturities. Long term refers to over 
three-year maturity, while medium and short term refer to one-to-three year 
and under one year, respectively. In 1962 medium-term trade credits 
amounted to over 80 percent of Korea's total debt. The next decade saw a 
consistent decline in the share of medium-term debt to 3.8 percent by 1971. 
Although the share of medium-term debt remained more or less constant 
during 1971-85, there have been significant changes in the relative 
importance of short- and long-term debt. Short-term debt increased 
dramatically during each period of rapid accumulation and fell, after a lag, 
during the subsequent recovery. The share of short-term debt jumped from 
16.4 percent in 1973 to 28.5 percent in 1975. In 1978 it declined to 21.2 
percent. By 1980 the share had soared to 34.5 percent. Since then, it has 
been substantially reduced to less than 21 percent in 1986. 
There have also been shifts in the distribution of the debt between the 
public sector, the nonbank private sector, and financial institutions. In 
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interpreting these numbers, it is important to bear in mind that the typical 
distinctions between public, private, and bank debt are somewhat misleading 
in Korea. First, external debt is overseen by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
and all borrowing requires prior approval. In effect, all loans are “publicly 
guaranteed” in the sense that they are ultimately backed by the Bank of 
Korea. Second, bank debt comprises loans to the banking system. These are 
treated as below-the-line, or accommodating flows, in Korean balance- 
of-payments statistics. The funds are then lent out to the private sector. 
During 1961-67 all long-term Korean debt was either public or private 
borrowing, except for some usage of IMF facilities beginning in 1965. From 
1966 to 1971 private debt substantially exceeded public debt. During 
1971-78 the two remained of comparable magnitudes. Since 1978 the 
importance of public debt has risen substantially relative to private debt. 
However, private and bank debts together have consistently exceeded public 
borrowing. 
Public and private borrowing continued to constitute 90 percent of the 
total until 1978. These items had fallen to 70 percent of the total by 1982 
and to only 52 percent by 1985. From 1978 to 1982 the declining importance 
of public and private debt is attributable to the growth in bank loans, foreign 
bank “A” accounts,’ and IMF facilities. After 1982 bonds were increased 
dramatically. 
3.2 Korean Corporations with Foreign Branches 
Borrowing by Korean enterprises with branches abroad is not included in 
external debt statistics. However, these figures are monitored by the MOF 
and are subject to the regulations of the Foreign Exchange Control Act. As 
shown in table 3.2,  this borrowing doubled between 1979 and 1982, 
reaching $5.4 billion. Since 1984 this borrowing by foreign branches has 
exceeded the total of private long-term loans. 
Table 3.2 Foreign Financing of Korean Companies with Branches Abroad, 1979-86 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total 2,447 3.712 4,463 5,377 5.710 5.976 6.076 5,619 
Trade companies 1,404 1.863 1,711 1.791 1.885 2,167 2,175 2.534 
Construction companies 964 1.758 2,649 3,456 3.672 3,631 3,560 2,722 
Other 79 91 103 130 150 I78 341 363 
Memo Foreign finance as 
a percentage 
of long term 
pnvate loans 0 4 4  0 6 0  0 69 0 85 0 93 I01  I06  1 0 4  
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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3.3 Indicators of Debt Burden 
In absolute terms, Korea is one of the most heavily indebted countries. 
Among the twenty largest debtor countries in 1983, Korea was fourth in 
terms of the level of its gross debt. However, the gross volume of debt can 
be a misleading indicator of the real burden of external borrowing. In 1983 
Korea was eleventh in terms of its debt/GNP ratio and fifteenth in terms of 
the ratio of debt service to exports.2 
Table 3.3 presents a number of measures of the burden of Korea’s debt. 
The debt/GNP ratio is given in the first column. The second and third 
columns show the ratios of total debt service to GNP and to exports. The 
final column shows the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to external debt. 
From the table it can be seen that the ratio of debt to GNP jumped in 1975 
and again in 1980 after an intermediate period of decline. The ratio 
continued to rise after 1980. The table also shows that, despite rapid debt 
accumulation over the period from 1970 to 1982, service payments fell as a 
proportion of foreign exchange earnings. Although debt rose from 34 to 53 
percent of GNP, rapid growth of exports has meant that the share of export 
revenues needed to service the debt has risen much more slowly. Also, 
receipts from invisibles have grown very quickly since the mid-1970s. By 
1982 service payments accounted for 21 percent of export receipts, but for 
less than 16 percent of total current revenues. Thus, the rapid growth of 
foreign exchange earnings plays a critical role in Korea’s experience with 
Table 3.3 Debt Burden Indicators, 1966-86 (in percentages) 
Year DebVGNP ServicelGNP ServicelExports ReservesfDebl 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
10.7 
15.1 
22.9 
27.2 
28.7 
31.2 
34.0 
31.5 
32.0 
40.5 
36.7 
33.8 
28.5 
32.5 
45.0 
49.0 
53.5 
53.1 
52.3 
56.3 
46.8 
0.4 
0.8 
0.9 
I .5 
3.3 
3.6 
3.9 
4.5 
3.8 
4.1 
4.0 
4.2 
4.6 
5.1 
6.9 
8.2 
8.2 
7.6 
8.3 
8.6 
10.0 
3.2 
5.4 
8.6 
18.5 
21.0 
18.7 
14.8 
14.4 
14.4 
12.1 
11.1 
13.9 
16.3 
16.0 
18.5 
20.1 
20.6 
18.8 
20.4 
21.7 
22.7 
60.6 
54.3 
32.6 
30.7 
26. I 
18.4 
20.6 
25.7 
17.8 
18.3 
28.1 
34.0 
33.2 
27.8 
21.2 
18.7 
16.8 
17.7 
16.5 
17.9 
20 
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external debt. Table 3.3 also shows that Korea accumulated foreign 
exchange reserves relative to debt during the recovery from the first and 
second crises, but did not replenish the reserve stock in the first few years 
after the most recent crisis. 
How does Korea compare to other debtor countries? Table 3.4 provides 
comparison debvexport and debt/GNP figures for three groups of countries. 
In 1980 Korea’s debt to export ratio was high relative to both the group of 
fifteen heavily indebted countries and the group which has not experienced 
debt servicing difficulties. The debt to output ratio was considerably higher 
than even the average for countries that did experience servicing difficulties. 
By 1986 Korea’s relative position had improved considerably. Its debt to 
export ratio had declined by 12 percent. In contrast, the ratio had risen by 44 
percent for countries without difficulties and 164 percent for those with 
difficulties. Korea’s debt to output ratio had fallen below the ratio for the 
countries having difficulties, but remained significantly higher than the ratio 
for the countries without difficulties. 
It is useful to consider all of these indicators because none is an ideal 
measure of the debt burden. The debt to GNP measure relates the total 
amount owed abroad to total domestic output, but does not indicate a 
country’s ability to transfer domestic into foreign resources so as to pay 
external debts. 
The debt to export ratio does focus on access to foreign exchange 
earnings. However, this indicator is also problematic because countries 
would differ in their foreign exchange requirements even if they had no 
external debts. In particular, Korea relies heavily on imported intermediates 
and raw materials for domestic production. The import requirements for 
exportables and for investment were 35 percent and 42 percent, respectively, 
in 1980. Over 1980-83 imports averaged 39.8 percent of GNP. In contrast, 
imports averaged 18.7 percent of output for the ten principal Baker 
Table 3.4 Cross-country Comparisons of Debt Burden 
1980 1982 1984 I986 
A. Long- and Short-Tern External Debt Relative to Exports of Goods and Services 
Korea 120.3 130.8 
135 heavily indebted countries 109.3 178.7 
Countries with recent debt servicing problems 151.2 241.5 
Countries without recent debt servicing problems 79.1 92.8 
B. Long- and Short-Term External Debt Relative to GDP 
Korea 45.1 53.5 
15 heavily indebted countries 30.8 41.7 
Countries with recent debt servicing problems 33.6 45.5 
Countries without recent debt servicing problems 20.5 24.9 
127.9 
178.9 
247.2 
96.3 
52.2 
46.8 
51.1 
27.3 
106.1 
288.1 
302.4 
114.0 
46.8 
48.4 
54.8 
32.5 
~~ 
Source. IMF, World Economrc Outlook. April 1987, for all countries except Korea (uses new SNA) 
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countries. The figure was 22-25 percent for Chile, Ecuador, Nigeria, Peru, 
the Philippines, and Venezuela and just 9-12 percent for Argentina, Brazil, 
and Mexico. 
3.4 Usage of External Debt 
The balance of payments accounts imply that increases in the stock of 
gross external debt must be equal to the current account deficit plus 
acquisitions of official foreign exchange reserves plus capital inflows. A 
useful way to write the identity is given below. 
Short-Term Long-Term 
and Direct 
Current 
Deficit 
- A Official + Private 
Reserves Capital Capital 
outflows Inflows 
A Gross 
External = Account + 
Debt 
The equation points out that current account deficits, reserve accumulation, 
and short-term capital flows (capital flight if it leaves the country) must be 
financed either by long-term capital movements and direct foreign invest- 
ment, or by accumulation of external debt. 
Exactly how foreign borrowing has been used has an important bearing on 
the ease with which a country can repay its debts. There are two key issues. 
The first is that debt which financed private capital outflows can be 
extremely difficult to repay because it does not increase domestic resources. 
Instead, a few private citizens hold assets abroad-the counterpart to the 
country’s external debt. To repay its liabilities, the government must 
mobilize and transfer domestic resources to the rest of the world. This is 
typically accomplished through subsidy cuts and tax increases to improve the 
government budget, and through real exchange rate depreciation and real 
wage reductions to increase competitiveness and to shift resources into the 
production of tradable goods. The transfer may well lead to a deterioration in 
the standard of living and/or in the distribution of income. 
The second issue concerns the sources of the current account deficit. 
National income accounts imply that a current account deficit is the foreign 
savings counterpart to the difference between domestic savings and 
investment. Countries can run large current account deficits because of high 
investments which will pay off through increased future productive capacity. 
They can also run large deficits with low investment when domestic savings 
are small, perhaps because of government budget problems or because of a 
spurt in imports of consumer goods. 
To the extent that external borrowing goes to finance a current account 
deficit which reflects strong investments (particularly in the traded goods 
sectors), a country should have little difficulty in repaying its obligations. 
Although there may be problems of liquidity in the short to medium term, 
resources should eventually become available to transfer abroad. However, 
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countries that borrow abroad to substitute for low private and/or government 
savings are likely to face the same difficulties of repayment as those that 
borrowed to finance capital flight. 
Korea’s use of debt distinguishes it from many of the other large debtor 
countries. For example, Dornbusch (1985b) points out that external debt 
accumulated in Argentina during 1978-82 went primarily to finance capital 
flight. In Brazil the debt financed current account deficits, but these reflected 
government dissavings and not high investments. The public sector had not 
adequately adjusted to the severe external shocks. Table 3.5 breaks down the 
use of external debt for Korea. The seven time periods include the three 
periods of rapid debt accumulation and the subsequent recoveries, as well as 
the 1986 developments. 
During each of the three accumulation periods the current account deficit 
accounts for the bulk of the increase. The current account deficit, together 
with reserve accumulation and errors and omissions from the balance of 
payments, accounted for at least 78 percent of the debt in all six  period^.^ In 
1983-85 much of the large discrepancy was due to an increase in exports on 
credit. Finally, about half of the huge 1986 current account surplus went to 
reducing external debt. 
Debt accumulation has not gone to finance capital flight. Except for the 
increased reserves (and more recently the increases in other assets), the 
primary usage of external borrowing has been to finance the imbalance 
between investment and domestic savings, In fact, Korea has maintained 
consistently high and rising investment rates, and domestic saving rates rose 
substantially during 1965-85. Unlike for either Argentina or Brazil, 
investment has played a central role in Korea’s debt accumulation. Chapter 8 
on savings and investment behavior explores these issues in more detail. 
3.5 The Cost of Foreign Borrowing 
Why was the private sector willing to borrow so much, so rapidly? Table 
3.6 gives a variety of interest rates, in addition to inflation and exchange rate 
Table 3.5 Use of External Debt, 1966-86 (in billions of U.S. dollars) 
1966-69 1970-73 1974-75 
Debt 1,594 245 4,186 
Current account 
deficit 1,285 2,150 3,910 
Foreign exchange 
accumulation 41 I 484 507 
Errors and 
omissions ( - )  I - 57 94 
Direct foreign 
investment ( - )  -40 -281 -232 
Discrepancy - 63 161 - 93 
1976-78 1979-82 1983-85 1986 
6,380 22,260 9.679 -2,252 
1,387 16,768 3,866 -4,617 
3.396 2.047 796 207 
585 2.406 2,716 544 
-308 -430 -522 - 477 
1,320 1.469 2,893 -2.091 
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Table 3.6 
Item 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-83 1984-85 1986 
The Cost of Foreign Capital, 1966-86 (annual average percentages) 
I .  Domestic bank lending ratea 24.4 17.4 18.0 13.8 10.0 10.0 
Curb market interest rate 54.2 40.1 41.4 30.5 24.4 23.2 
2. Foreign interest rate' 7.2 7.9 9.5 13.0 9.5 6.7 
3. Exchange rate depreciation' 3.1 9.3 4.7 8.5 5.9 1.3 
4. Domestic inflation rate (GDP deflator) 15.4 18.8 20.9 8.5 4.0 1.4 
5. Interest rate differential 
between home and foreign 
markets [ ( I )  - (2) - (3)l 14.1 0.2 3.8 -7.7 -5.4 2.0 
6. Real private cost of borrowing 
abroad [(2) + (3) - (4)] -5.1 -1.6 -6.7 13.0 11.4 6.6 
Source: BOK, Monthly Bulletin, various issues, and IMF, International Financial Sratistics. various issues. 
*Discounts on bills of Deposit Money Banks. 
'Ninety-day Euro-dollar rate. 
'Period average. 
depreciation. The figures show that there were strong reasons to borrow 
abroad instead of domestically, even for those firms that had access to credit 
from the official banking system. The incentives were even stronger for 
those firms that could only borrow domestically through the unorganized 
(curb) markets. (Korean financial markets are discussed in chapter 11 .) 
The interest differential between domestic and foreign borrowing was a 
full 14 percent during 1966-70, the first period of rapid debt accumulation. 
It fell to about 1 percent during 1971-80, however, the real cost of foreign 
borrowing remained negative as domestic inflation outstripped depreciation 
of the won. During 1981-85 the incentives reversed dramatically. The 
interest differential between domestic and foreign borrowing had turned 
negative. The slowdown in domestic inflation, combined with a substantial 
depreciation, made the real cost to foreign borrowing jump from -6.7 
percent in 1976-80 to 13.0 percent in 1981-83 and then to 11.4 percent in 
1984-85. During 1986 the exchange rate began to appreciate, while 
domestic inflation and foreign interest rates continued to fall. Despite little 
change in domestic nominal rates, borrowing abroad once again became 
relatively less expensive than borrowing from domestic banks. 
3.6 Foreign Aid and Concessional Lending 
We have seen that virtually all of Korean imports and gross investment 
was financed by foreign aid during the 1950s. However, the importance of 
foreign aid declined precipitously during the 1960s, becoming a negligible 
source of funding by the mid-1970s. 
Table 3.7 summarizes aid flows to Korea during 1948-83. (A more 
detailed breakdown of foreign aid is given in the Data Appendix.) As shown, 
the United States is by far the largest donor. The flows rose to a high of 16 
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Table 3.7 Average Annual Aid Received, 1948-83 (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Period Total U.S. 
1948-55 150.9 84.4 
1956-60 299.7 290.3 
1961-65 185.8 185.8 
1966-71 91.2 91.2 
1972-77 2.0 2.0 
1978-83 0.2 0.2 
Source: BOK, Economics Statistics Yearbook. 1972, 1984. 
percent of GNP in 1957, averaged 8-9 percent during 1959-62, 2 percent 
during 1966-68, 1 percent during 1969-71, and have been negligible since 
1972. The majority of the flows were nonproject assistance used to finance 
imports of raw materials and capital goods. The magnitude of these flows 
implied that the United States had a critical influence over Korean 
investment decisions during this p e r i ~ d . ~  
After the overthrow of Syngman Rhee in 1960, Korean policies 
increasingly encouraged foreign borrowing from private sources. By 1967 
foreign loans and foreign direct investment each played a more important 
role than foreign aid. 
However, these figures underestimate the effective amount of aid because 
some of Korea’s public loans during the 1960s and 1970s were on 
concessional terms and the grant element of these loans has not been 
included. As Krueger (1982, 154) points out, almost all public borrowing 
between 1966 and 1969 came from either the United States or Japan, so that 
one sensible correction focuses on public debt from these sources. In fact, 
PL 480 and development loans came almost exclusively from the United 
States during 1961-75. The magnitude of these loans increased as other 
U.S. aid tapered off, implying that the total remained approximately 
constant in nominal terms through 1972. In 1965 the Japanese Settlement 
(treated as a reparations settlement and not as aid by Korean authorities) 
called for $500 million in grants and public loans to be disbursed over the 
next decade. 
An alternative approach to estimating the grant element in Korea’s foreign 
loans is to examine the terms of the borrowing. Table 3.8 shows interest 
rates and terms of repayment for (committed) foreign capital during 
1959-74. There is a marked difference between public and commercial 
loans. Taking the weighted average figures, public loans enjoyed a 3 percent 
reduction in interest rates, a 4.7 year increase in the grace period, and a 
repayment period almost 16 years longer than that for commercial loans. 
Strictly comparable data is not available for the more recent period. To 
provide an updated indication of the amount of Korea’s concessional 
lending, table 3.9 computes the average interest rates for public, commer- 
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Table 3.8 Foreign Loans by Interest Rates and Terms of Repayment, 1959-74 
(commitment basis, weiahted averages) 
Commercial Public 
~ ~~ 
Interest rate (7%) 7.1 4.1 
Grace period (years) 2.5 7.2 
Repayment period (years) 10.1 26.0 
Total (millions of U.S. $) 4,166.5 2,764.4 
Source: Krueger (1982, 156-57, table 45) 
Table 3.9 Average Interest Rates on Long-term Loans, 1972-86 
Year Public Commercial Bank LIBOR" 
1972 6.0 7. I 8.5 5.4 
1973 4.7 8.5 11.1 9.4 
1974 3.3 9.4 23.4 10.9 
1975 4.5 9.3 16.2 7.0 
1976 5.3 8.4 12.0 5.6 
1977 5.7 9.2 15.7 6.0 
1978 6.6 10.0 17.8 8.9 
1979 6.5 10.0 27.9 12.1 
1980 7. I 12.0 16.9 14.2 
1981 6.8 12.7 19.8 16.9 
1982 7.8 12.4 15.2 13.3 
1983 6.2 10.0 11.4 9.7 
1984 6.6 10.8 11.3 10.9 
1985 5.8 9.5 8.8 8.4 
1986 6.9 10.1 8.4 6.9 
Source: EPB, Major Statistics: MOF, Fiscal and Banking Statisrics; and IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. various issues. 
Note: Average interest rates are computed as total interest payments divided by debt outstanding at the end of 
the preceding year. 
'LIBOR = London interbank offer rate for dollar deposits. 
cial, and bank long-term loans from 1972-86.5 The figures show that 
interest rates on bank loans are higher and more variable than rates on other 
private sector loans and that public loans have enjoyed the lowest rates. This 
component includes the public long-term debt originally lent at concession- 
ary terms. Also, the majority of the fixed interest loans are public loans, 
while commercial and bank borrowing is typically at variable interest rates 
(see table 3.10). During 1980-84 approximately 70 percent of public debt 
was at fixed interest rates as compared to only 7 percent of bank debt and 
virtually no private debt. 
3.7 The Process of Borrowing and Repayment Guarantees 
Finally, we turn to another aspect of Korea's debt which distinguishes it 
from borrowing in many other debtor countries. As we mentioned earlier, the 
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Table 3.10 Fixed versus Variable Interest Rates as a Percentage of Total Debt, 1980-84 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Fixed rates 
Public 
Private 
Bank 
Variable rates 
Public 
Private 
Bank 
34.0 
30.5 
0.0 
3.5 
66.0 
16.2 
18.0 
31.8 
34.1 
31.2 
0. I 
2.8 
65.9 
12.8 
14.8 
38.3 
32.8 
30. I 
0. I 
2.6 
61.2 
12. I 
12.5 
42.6 
31.6 
28.8 
0.3 
2.5 
68.4 
11.9 
14.6 
41.9 
31.2 
27.8 
0.6 
2.8 
68.8 
11.6 
11.9 
45.3 
Source: MOF, White Rook. 1986, p. 36 
MOF monitors and oversees all borrowing activities in Korea. In practice, 
all loans require prior approval and can be considered “government 
guaranteed .’ ’ 
Debt monitoring has had important implications because it has meant that 
Korean authorities have kept up to date about the volume of external 
borrowing. In fact, as discussed further in part 2 (see esp. ch. 8), borrowing 
has figured prominently in the five-year plans as a means of financing 
investment, and a large portion of the debt accumulation was anticipated. 
The very strict borrowing process has also played an integral part in Korea’s 
industrial and development policy by directing the allocation of foreign 
funds to particular industries and to particular firms, focusing on successful 
exporters. 
In describing the loan application process it is useful to distinguish 
between three types of loans. First, there are loans which are directly 
controlled by MOF. These include public sector loans, financial credits to 
special banks (Korea Exchange Bank [KEB], Korea Development Bank 
[KDB], and Korea Export Import Bank [KEXIM] and import credits of less 
than three years original maturity. The second category is borrowing by 
financial institutions. These loans are subject to the foreign exchange 
regulations administered by the Bank of Korea (BOK). 
The third category requires application to the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) for appraisal. These include loans to nonfinancial private borrowers 
and import credits of more than three-year maturity. The application includes 
a report on the firm’s creditworthiness and on the desired usage of the funds. 
Projects are selected depending on whether they are judged to be consistent 
with developmental goals specified in the current five-year plan-expanding 
targeted industrial sectors and improving the balance of payments. The EPB 
is responsible for choosing among competing projects, typically favoring 
solicited ones. 
One example of government influence resulted from the shifts in loan 
allocation that came with the priority shift of the Big Push toward heavy and 
chemical industry. Table 3.  I 1  shows that the share of foreign loans going to 
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Table 3. I I Foreign Loans by Destination, 1966-82 (shares of total) 
Debtination 1966-70 1971-75 1976- 80 1981-82 
Agriculture, forestry. and fisheries 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Heavy and chemical 
Light 
Social overhead 
Services 
Other 
Total (million U.S. $) 
11.4 
I .0 
(22.7) 
(17.1) 
39.5 
6.5 
1.8 
1,693.2 
39.8 
13.0 
38.8 
(26.3) 
(12.5) 
13.4 
5.0 
- 
29.8 
4,523.2 I 
6.7 9.2 
0.1 0.2 
39.4 15.2 
( 8 . 6 )  (2.4) 
38.8 55.5 
14.5 14.4 
0.3 5.3 
1 1,810.5 5.734. I 
(30.8) (12.8) 
Soirrce: EPB, Economic lridirarors of Korco. 1983 
Nore;  Dash indicates that data were not available. 
this sector rose from 23 percent in the late 1960s to 31 percent during the 
Big Push and fell to just 13 percent once the Big Push had ended in the 
1980s. Allocation of domestic loans has also been an important issue in 
Korean development. As discussed in chapter 11, rankings of priority 
industries and loan ceilings have been used to ration credit. 
Virtually all foreign loans require repayment guarantees. Originally 
(1963-66), the KDB issued foreign loan guarantees (in won) to the BOK 
which issued a guarantee of convertibility directly to the foreign lender. The 
guarantees had to be authorized by the National Assembly, often involving 
special bargains and inducements from the EPB and MOF.6 Since 1966 
commercial and specialized banks have been allowed to issue repayment 
guarantees for private foreign loans without prior authorization from the 
National Assembly. They guarantee the loan (in won) to the BOK, which 
assures convertibility. (Guarantees issued by the Foreign Exchange Bank are 
secondary acceptances on the guarantees of other banks.) Loans which are 
judged to be difficult for commercial banks to guarantee (for example, large 
loans to public enterprise) receive government guarantees through the KDB. 
All commercial banks in Korea were government owned until the early 
1980s. Since 1982, five large commercial banks have been transferred to 
private ownership. In practice, the banks usually acted as passive partners in 
issuing repayment guarantees. They did not actively examine the loan 
applications once they had been arranged between the borrower and lender 
and approved by the EPB or MOF. Thus, when faced with the problem of 
whether to bail out the banks during difficult periods in which firms, and 
therefore banks, were unable to pay, the government found it hard to hold 
the banks responsible. 
3.8 Summary 
Foreign capital inflows have played a central role in Korean economic 
development. We have already emphasized the importance of foreign aid 
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during the initial recovery stages. This chapter has documented the rapid 
accumulation of external debts beginning in the early 1960s. 
The chapter has made four main points. First, most of the debt 
accumulation took place during 1966-69, 1974-75, and 1979-82. Second, 
growth of the nominal debt stock overstates the burden of the debt because 
of the very rapid growth rates of GNP and exports. As we shall see in 
chapter 7, a substantial portion of Korean growth is attributable to 
investments financed by foreign borrowing. 
Third, Korea’s debt has been used primarily to finance current account 
deficits. For this reason, subsequent chapters will focus on the behavior of 
domestic savings and investment, recognizing that the excess of domestic 
savings over investment is the counterpart to a current account imbalance. 
Finally, Korea, unlike many other developing countries, has carefully 
monitored foreign borrowing. Up-to-date and accurate statistics are main- 
tained. In fact, the allocation of foreign (and domestic) credit has played a 
central role in Korea’s growth strategy, facilitating the rapid growth of 
exports. Comprehensive and current information has also enabled policy- 
makers to react relatively quickly to external and internal economic 
developments. 
4 Three Cycles of Debt 
Accumulation, 1960 - 86 
This chapter examines Korea’s macroeconomic performance and experience 
with external debt from 1960 to 1986. As pointed out in chapter 3,  most of 
Korea’s debt was accumulated during one of three periods: 1966-69, 
1974-75, or 1979-81. Each period can be characterized as a cycle in which 
an initial phase of economic difficulty and growth slowdown was followed 
by a subsequent recovery with resumed growth. As we shall see, only the 
economic downturn during the third cycle was severe enough to be classified 
as a crisis by international standards. However, all three declines in 
performance were viewed with concern by Korean policymakers. Each of 
the three cycles also involved important shifts in economic policy as 
domestic authorities responded to external developments and to changes in 
domestic macroeconomic performance. 
While it is convenient to discuss each cycle separately, it is also important 
to identify the broad trends which developed throughout Korea’s recent 
history. In particular, when we pick up the story, Korea has a war-devastated 
economy, heavily dependent on foreign aid. By 1986 it has successfully 
